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ICFY MEMORANDUM TO LORD OWEN, 23 APRIL 1993
SUBJ: CROAT-MUSLIM TENSIONS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA
1. CURRENT SITUATION. The ongoing outbreak of violence in Central Bosnia is an escalated continuation of tensions that have existed since last October. At that time there was fighting between Muslims and Croats in Vitez. In January, when agreement to the Vance/Owen plan seemed imminent, fighting erupted again in Central Bosnia. Now, in the most widespread conflict to date, the objectives are more clearly understood.
2. The current fighting owes its beginnings to a series of events throughout April. On 8 April Boban made a speech in Travnik and called for more prominent display of the Croat flag. (It is fairly certain that Susak was not there.) This led to shooting and the death of two Muslims the same day. That week the Croat authorities in Mostar gave prominence to their claim that Jablanica is part of Herzeg-Bosna. The Muslim President of Jablanica crisis committee, Cibo, was arrested by the HVO (and subsequently released after Izetbegovic's intervention). In Prozor the HVO clearly provoked tension by issuing call-up papers to Muslims, who fled and were protected in the hills by outside Muslim forces. The HVO pursued and arrested some Muslims for resisting call-up, although they were already soldiers in the BiH Army.
3. CONFLICT CAUSES. It is becoming more apparent that the objectives of both sides are not random. There are clear indications of coordinated action to establish areas of control in Central Bosnia. Locally engineered events and objectives form a pattern. The use of five Muslim brigades against Vitez, and three against Busovaca, indicate careful coordination. The build up of tension by the HVO through disinformation, followed by military action, is well orchestrated.
4. HVO objectives are to link Croat communities across the territory. One objective has been to secure the road Prozor/Fojnica/Kiseljak, clearing Muslim villages along the route. Another objective is to take Jablanica. This battle is expected imminently. Muslim intentions are to break up Croat linkages and exercise control over the HVO, for both local security reasons and to counter the strategic hold that Croats have over access to Tuzla. Informed opinion believes both sides are provoking the fighting but that the HVO is more aggressive. The timing of the Croat moves, both in January and now, is coincidental with world attention focussed on Serb activity elsewhere, which could imply a carefully judged use of this as cover.
5. Objectives, particularly of the Croats, are to secure ethnic cohesion and control of Provinces 8 and10. More local issues which fuel the situation include: the increasing number of Muslims seeking refuge in these provinces; the unwelcome presence of non-local forces (eg displaced from Jajce); strategic concerns over routes; and overlapping command structures of HVO and BiH Army forces in the same areas. All these make the prospects for joint command and control very slim.
6. AGREEMENTS AND INITIATIVES. On 20 April an agreement was reached between both sides in Zenica following a meeting requested by the Muslims. Ganic, Halilovic, and Siber attended from Sarajevo and the HVO was represented by Petkovic and Blaskic. The key elements of the agreement were:
Recognition of both the BH Army and the HVO as equal and legitimate forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Immediate ceasefire.
Establishment of a Joint Operational Centre in Vitez, evolving into a Joint HQ in Kakanj. Daily reporting. Representation at Deputy Commander level, with UNPROFOR and ECMM observers.
Local Joint Commissions in Mostar and Busovaca.
Weekly meetings at C-in-C level (Halilovic and Petkovic).
7. ASSESSMENT. It is assessed that the situation will continue to deteriorate, particularly in light of the latest confirmed atrocities against Muslims and the build up of an offensive on Jablanica. The killing has commenced in earnest and will be difficult to stop. The confidence-building Joint Operational Centre and Joint Commissions are unlikely to have a major influence on regional events, but may provide short-term local results. Therefore, pressure now for joint command arrangements would be premature. The return of displaced forces to their original locations and intervening between the sides in a peacekeeping role would reduce some tensions, but this is clearly not practical at the moment.
8. The only viable option immediately available is to monitor the actions of known politico-military personalities in the area and demand their restraint both directly and indirectly through leaning on their ultimate superiors (Boban and Izetbegovic). They, in turn, should be encouraged to make unequivocable public statements reiterating the 20 April agreement and emphasising their support for it. Given that both leaders have, in the past, been guilty of not publicly supporting agreements and even denying them, this would be more binding and constructive in the present environment than anything else.
Annex 1
COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE BiH ARMY AND THE HVO
1. The BiH Army and the HVO will retain their separate identities and command structures. Their functions will include all aspects of personnel, logistics, administration, training, morale and identity.
2. They will form a Joint Command which will be responsible for the operational control of military districts.
3. The Joint Command will consist of the two Commanders in Chief, General Halilovic and General Petkovic, who will meet on a regular basis, at least weekly. They will form a permanent joint headquarters to be located at Kakanj and consisting of at least 3 high calibre officers nominated by each Commander in Chief. These officers will work together on a continuous basis to plan and control the operations of all BiH Army and HVO units.
4. The two Commanders in Chief will form military districts, under the joint headquarters, whose areas will be related to the operational requirement for joint operations and not to provisional provincial boundaries. Their areas will not overlap. Each military district will have a commander and a deputy appointed by the Joint Command. In each case one will be drawn from the BiH Army and the other from the HVO.
5. Each military district will exercise operational control over all BiH army and HVO units in its area.
FROM LORD OWEN TO EC FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING INFORMAL MEETING AT HINDSGAVL CASTLE, 23 APRIL 1993
SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
With world attention focussed on the situation in Bosnia, and indeed in particular on Srebrenica, there is risk of failing to give enough attention to Croatia and the broader picture. There are a number of particularly dangerous situations developing in Croatia, and the extent to which Bosnia and Croatia are interrelated becomes ever clearer. Nevertheless our immediate strategy must be to contain the conflict to Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the lowest possible level of violence with the highest possible level of humanitarian relief.
CROATIA
The outlook for a peaceful settlement between the Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs does not look hopeful at the moment, and there is a real danger of major hostilities breaking out again between the Serbs and the Croats, with or without the involvement of the Yugoslav Army (JA). The Krajina Serbs have rejected the sovereignty provisions of UNSCR 815, and the indications are that they would like not to endorse the conditional agreement implementing UNSCR 802 signed in Geneva on April 6. The establishment of a union between the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) and Karadzic's Republika Srpska (RS) was due to be announced on 23 April. The likelihood is that this was postponed only after Milosevic's intervention following my meeting with him in Belgrade on 21 April.
It is becoming ever more clear that solving the situation in Croatia is closely linked to reaching a settlement in Bosnia. Milosevic accepts this and was keen on 21 April to try and have a meeting in Athens on Sunday 25 April with Tudjman, Izetbegovic and Boban. Milosevic also suggested that the Croatian Serb leader Bjegovic should also attend, possibly with Hadzic. Milosevic warned Prime Minister Mitsotakis of this possibility and Mitsotakis confirmed his readiness to host it at less than 24 hours notice. Susak has said that Tudjman would in principle attend. I cannot make a judgement on such a meeting until I have seen Izetbegovic on Saturday afternoon.
The danger is that if there are no prospects of agreement with the Krajina Serbs the Croatians, frustrated by the lack of progress, may try to force the pace and take military action. The results of such a policy could be disastrous as it would definitely involve a Bosnian Serb reaction and quite possibly a Belgrade Serb reaction in the Eastern Sector. It is vital that Tudjman realises this. Tudjman should be constantly and forcefully reminded of this, and Vance did so in Washington on 21 April. The international community has helped Tudjman further his aims, both by including the recognition of Croatia's existing borders in SCR 815, and for the mild slap on the wrist Croatia received for its attack on Maslenica, which did cost the lives of UNPROFOR troops. It is in Tudjman's interests not to lose the international support which he has, and he needs to be made well aware of the dangers of acting rashly, even in response to outright Serb provocation.
Precipitate Croatian military activity would undoubtedly meet with significant opposition from the well-armed local Serbs who have managed to successfully contain the 3 Croatian attacks so far this year. Unification of the Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska could provide the Serbs with the necessary spur to undertake united offensive actions. They may well be tempted to use any further Croatian offensive(s) as a pretext to go all out for their acknowledged objectives of capturing Osijek (probably their highest priority) and then Karlovac, and perhaps later driving a route to the sea around Zadar and/or the Boka Kotorska area. They may feel that they have nothing to lose.
There is also an added risk that the JA may get involved openly, particularly if the Croatians threatened Eastern Slavonia. Although it is not certain that Belgrade is yet ready for such involvement, it could, however, get carried along on the tide. When challenged about recent JA involvement in Eastern Bosnia Cosic, Milosevic and Bulatovic denied it, but they knew that I knew that they were involved.
All these factors have grave implications for the presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia. If there is no negotiated settlement between the Serbs and Croats it is unlikely that an acceptable mandate can be negotiated for continued UNPROFOR presence. In these circumstances it is likely that there would be increased pressure to withdraw UNPROFOR completely, which could lead to the spreading of the conflict. If the existing mandate remained in force a number of contributors would probably withdraw their forces. A third possibility would be the reduction of UNPROFOR in Croatia to an Observer Force, capable of reporting on the situation, but with no wider responsibilities. This would no doubt lead to further criticism of the UN being powerless to intervene and just standing by while military action went ahead unchecked.
CROAT-MUSLIM TENSIONS
The ongoing outbreak of violence in Central Bosnia is an escalated continuation of tensions that have existed since last October. There was fighting between Muslims and Croats in Vitez in January. The fighting that has erupted again in Central Bosnia is the most widespread conflict to date.
The current fighting owes its beginnings to a series of events throughout April. On 8 April Boban made a speech in Travnik and called for more prominent display of the Croat flag. (It is fairly certain that Susak was not there.) This led to shooting and the death of two Muslims the same day. That week the Croat authorities in Mostar gave prominence to their claim that Jablanica is part of Herzeg-Bosna. The Muslim President of Jablanica crisis committee, Cibo, was arrested by the HVO (and subsequently released after Izetbegovic's intervention). In Prozor the HVO clearly provoked tension by issuing call-up papers to Muslims, who fled and were protected in the hills by outside Muslim forces. The HVO pursued and arrested some Muslims for resisting call-up, although they were already soldiers in the Bosnian Army.
It is becoming more apparent that the objectives of both sides are not random. There are clear indications of coordinated action to establish areas of control in Central Bosnia. Locally engineered events and objectives form a pattern. The use of five Muslim brigades against Vitez, and three against Busovaca, indicate careful coordination. The build up of tension by the HVO through disinformation, followed by military action, is well orchestrated.
HVO objectives are to link Croat communities across the territory. One objective has been to secure the road Prozor/Fojnica/Kiseljak, clearing Muslim villages along the route. Another objective is to take Jablanica. This battle is expected imminently. Muslim intentions are to break up Croat linkages and exercise control over the HVO, for both local security reasons and to counter the strategic hold that Croats have over access to Tuzla. Informed opinion believes both sides are provoking the fighting but that the HVO is more aggressive. The timing of the Croat moves, both in January and now, is coincidental with world attention focussed on Serb activity elsewhere, which could imply a carefully judged use of this as cover.
The objectives, particularly of the Croats, are to secure ethnic cohesion and control of Provinces 8 and 10. More local issues which fuel the situation include: the increasing number of Muslims seeking refuge in these provinces; the unwelcome presence of non-local forces (eg displaced from Jajce); strategic concerns over routes; and overlapping command structures of HVO and Bosnian Army forces in the same areas. All these make the prospects for joint command and control very slim.
On 20 April an agreement was reached between both sides in Zenica following a meeting requested by the Muslims. Ganic, Halilovic, and Siber attended from Sarajevo and the HVO was represented by Petkovic and Blaskic. The key elements of the agreement were:
Recognition of both the Bosnian Army and the HVO as equal and legitimate forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Immediate ceasefire.
Establishment of a Joint Operational Centre in Vitez, evolving into a Joint HQ in Kakanj. Daily reporting. Representation at Deputy Commander level, with UNPROFOR and ECMM observers.
Local Joint Commissions in Mostar and Busovaca.
Weekly meetings at C-in-C level (Halilovic and Petkovic).
I am due to meet Izetbegovic and Boban at 3pm in Zagreb on Saturday to mediate a situation which is assessed as most likely to continue to deteriorate, particularly in light of the latest confirmed atrocities against Muslims and the build up of an offensive on Jablanica. The killing will be difficult to stop. The confidence-building Joint Operational Centre and Joint Commissions are unlikely to have a major influence on regional events, but may provide short-term local results. Pressure now for joint command arrangements could be premature. The return of displaced forces to their original locations and intervening between the sides in a peacekeeping role would reduce some tensions, but this is clearly not practical at the moment.
The only viable option immediately available appears to be to monitor the actions of known politico-military personalities in the area and demand their restraint both directly and indirectly through leaning on their ultimate superiors (Boban and Izetbegovic). In turn, I will encourage them to make unequivocable public statements reiterating the 20 April agreement and emphasising their support for it. Given that both leaders have, in the past, been guilty of not publicly supporting agreements and even denying them, this would be more binding and constructive in the present environment than anything else. I fear the Serbs are enjoying our discomfort at all this disarray but far from destroying the Vance Owen plan I see it as emphasising the need for a UN peacekeeping force with a strong mandate throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
BOSNIAN SERBS
The Bosnian Serb leaders are currently riding high, after a series of military victories. They think the international community is unable to come up with an effective strategy to bring them back into serious negotiations. There remains the risk that Mladic, who appears less and less under control of Karadzic, may try to press ahead with the capture of Zepa and Gorazde, a strategically important transportation hub. There is also the possibility that he will turn his attention to securing the Northern Corridor. Mladic's mood is very confident, and he seems to be ready to disregard political guidance. It may have been only the direct intervention of Milosevic, to whom Mladic seems to show continued loyalty, which stopped him from pressing ahead with the capture of Srebrenica . Mladic's original terms for the surrender of the town were much harsher than those finally agreed - linkage to movement of Serbs from Tuzla, Muslim fighters to be POWs. Karadzic's promises to come up with new proposals have turned out to be reruns of old ideas based on territorial gains they have made, and recognition of the Republika Srpska. The mood at Wahlgren's meeting with the Serb leadership in Pale on Orthodox Easter Sunday was one of triumphalism. Mladic made it clear that the Republika Srpska would carry on regardless of what the rest of the world thinks, says or does. But I am not sure that he is a lost cause. I had 3 hours with him on Wednesday with our UN and British brigadiers, and the latter spent 5 hours with Mladic on Thursday and 1.5 hours with General Panic. A lot of this time was spent explaining how a northern corridor with a UN throughway, demilitarised 5 km on either side, could guarantee access to Banja Luka Province, but there was also considerable discussion of US military technology and their airpower, as demonstrated in Iraq.
I think Milosevic is beginning to accept that a territorial corridor for the Serbs is non negotiable, but will know more when I meet Dr Karadzic on Saturday morning and find out whether he is prepared to buy a UN corridor. I increasingly believe that selling the UN throughway or corridor from Derventa to Brcko needs to be set in a broader context if the Bosnian Serbs are to be shifted. I would like to expand the concept so that we have the Zagreb-Belgrade Autoput from the Banja Luka exit, which is curently blocked and within the Western and Eastern UNPAs, recognised as a throughway, and eventually coming under the proposed International Access Authority (IAA). The IAA would also be responsible for the railway lines from Bosnia to Belgrade, and from Bosnia, winding in and out of Croatia, from Knin to Split. This regional guaranteed access would need Tudjman's support, and as yet I have not been able to put it to him, though Susak has been briefed. EC support for this idea would be helpful, particularly German backing.
There are few signs that the Bosnian Serbs' political leaders are as yet really worried about the tighter sanctions which will come into force on 26 April or even limited international military intervention, and they are likely to continue to play a delaying game. Their rank and file will be influenced by Mladic. If he decides they should not press on with military action in the face of a definite risk of international action this would be decisive. A big question is how much influence Milosevic has on Mladic these days.
BELGRADE SERBS
It remains to be seen whether the tougher sanctions envisaged under UNSCR 820 will have the desired effect. It may be that Milosevic, who is more sensitive to the impact of the increased sanctions, particularly their financial aspects, will demand that the Bosnian Serb leadership not just go back to the negotiating table, but sign up. No doubt you will be considering what options exist for exerting more pressure, beyond attempting to tighten the sanctions even further. I hope that you will consider further toughening the provisions on financial aspects of the sanctions package. Milosevic is acting financially like a drug baron, and we should use the powers we have developed to deal with the offshore funds and third party companies of drug barons.
There are three military possibilities suggested for presurising the Belgrade Serbs:
-lifting the arms embargo for the Muslims;
-interdicting by air Bosnian Serb supply lines within Bosnia and Herzegovina;
-and conducting air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets, particularly heavy weapons.
Lifting the arms embargo is presented as giving the Muslims the chance to defend themselves against the more heavily armed and better equipped Serbs. I cannot stress enough to all of you that I believe this would be a profound mistake. I understand the political pressure to do this coming from the United States, but I cannot see how anyone reading my earlier account of Croat-Muslim tensions in Central Bosnia could believe that this option would be anything other than profoundly damaging. But I also believe that far from helping tilt the balance towards the Bosnian Muslims, the almost inevitable supplies of 1990's weapons from the former Soviet Union to the JA is more likely to tilt the balance even further towards the Serbs. It might salve people's consciences for a few weeks, but it could be a fatal step towards a wider Balkan war.
But if we do not lift the arms embargo, we have to be ready to take further action within the UN to tilt the military balance against the Serbs. We have done this since October when under President Bush's threat of enforcement I was able to negotiate with Dr Karadzic the grounding of all combat aircraft. We have taken a symbolic further step by enforcing the No-Fly Zone. It is a perfectly logical next step to ask the Security Council, if sanctions fail to dissuade the Belgrade Serbs from supplying the Bosnian Serb army, for authorisation to take the necessary measures to interdict the supply lines from the air. Of course this action would not of itself defeat the Bosnian Serbs, but it would tilt the balance in favour of the two armies that have signed up for the peace plan. It would be difficult for the Russians to accept such action, but it is far more likely that they would accept this limited peace keeping action than authorising offensive air to ground attacks on military targets. Any of these military actions would almost certainly lead to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops and affect the humanitarian effort, but with the winter over it is easier to give the highest priority to ending the war.
My own advice is to do everything to contain the fighting to Bosnia and Herzegovina and facing down the Bosnian serbs' direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council now is for all its problems a far better option than trying to halt a Serb-Croat war, or increased Serbian oppression in Kosovo.
David Owen
LORD OWEN'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, 27 APRIL 1993
LORD OWEN'S VISIT TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 21-26 APRIL
1. Lord Owen would be grateful if you could deliver the following personal message to both Kozyrev and Churkin.
"During my extensive meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership and Presidents Cosic, Milosevic and Bulatovic, from 21-26 April, I went the final mile in trying to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign up for the Vance/Owen Peace Plan. I emphasized all the time that the Plan was not anti-Serb and not designed to harm the Serb nation. I had spent ten weeks in New York, trying to persuade the US Administration that the Plan was not pro-Serb. I went through the Plan carefully explaining its flexibilities, but it was clear that the Bosnian Serbs, particularly Karadzic, had paid little attention whatsoever to its details (and the three Presidents made known their intense frustration at this). With the threat of drastic sanctions hanging over their heads and calls growing for military action against them, the Bosnian Serbs had a final chance to reach an honourable settlement, and save Serbia and Montenegro from these crippling new sanctions. They missed this chance.
I went to great lengths, which you have already been informed of, to meet Serb concerns over the Northern Corridor, while continually emphasising that a territorial corridor was non-negotiable. I also went through the flexibilities that the Plan offered on other questions relating to the map, pointing out that a number of Serb concerns could be dealt with through the Boundary Commission, notably the questions of Popovo Polje and the city of Sarajevo. However, I stressed the difficulty of agreeing any major changes in the map. What the Serbs should do was to sign up for the Plan, and then as the situation calmed it would be easier to reach agreement with the other two parties on mutually satisfactory changes in provincial boundaries.
To meet Bosnian Serb concerns (in particular those of General Mladic) about leaving Serb villages to the mercy of Muslim and Croat forces when the Bosnian Serb Army withdrew, I proposed that these areas would only be occupied by UN Forces. I agreed that it was unacceptable to ask people to accept the presence of those they considered their enemies, and with whom they had been fighting, immediately after hostilities ceased. I emphasised however, that there was no question of establishing "UNPAs" and that these areas would from day one come under the administration of the new provincial governments, though their police forces would, in accordance with the interim arrangements, be formed on a proportional basis.
Despite all the explanations and efforts to be flexible and the assurance that the consensus mechanism built into the Interim Arrangements protected the Serbs, which Milosevic and Cosic picked up again and emphasised to him, Karadzic remained completely obdurate on every single matter and seemed blissfully unaware of the full implications of what failure to reach a settlement would mean. By Sunday afternoon, Cosic, Milosevic and Bulatovic, who all did realise what would happen, seemed to have decided to put their weight behind our Plan and made a genuine effort to pressurise Karadzic. This impression was reinforced by the fact that the three Presidents wrote an open letter to the Assembly saying that the Bosnian Serbs had no right to submit 10 million Yugoslav citizens to further sanctions. They accepted that the process of negotiation and clarification had reached the point where it was reasonable for the Bosnian Serbs to sign up for the Interim Arrangements and the Map. They failed to do so and we should have no truck whatsoever with Karadzic's proposal for a referendum.
We have reached a situation similar to that in Geneva in January, when the three Presidents made known their support for the nine constitutional principles, and Karadzic eventually signed up. We must be sensitive in our approach and, although the tighter sanctions are now in place, we must not feed Serbian paranoia or fatalism, but try to draw distinction between the Bosnian Serbs who have put themselves beyond the pale, and the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership who have put their support for the Plan on paper and who acted constructively throughout our negotiations. The world will now demand action to back up the words of the Presidents' letter and we should expect them to fully cooperate with the deployment of the UN monitors along the length of the Montenegrin and Serbian frontier and cut off all supplies which fuel the war in Bosnia. They should use their undoubted influence on the Serbs in Krajina to accept the cease fire negotiated in Geneva on 6 April and enter into political discussions on autonomy within Croatia for the Krajina Serbs. They should also agree that if the Bosnian Serbs fail to allow the free passage of humanitarian supplies, then the UN forces should be able to use force to get them through. Taking these actions would show the world that they were acting in good faith. Not to do so would lead to further moves towards total political isolation in a matter of days.
On the question of air strikes, I have never advocated anything more than interdiction of supply lines and have emphasised that any such action should only be within the confines of Security Council decisions. I believe that to raise the arms embargo would be a profound mistake and could not fail to lead to more extensive hostilities and an increase in horrific incidents such as those seen during the Muslim-Croat clashes in Central Bosnia .
The international community must continue to put pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to sign up on the two remaining documents. No one has yet been able to come up with a credible alternative to the Plan and it is impossible to put pressure on in a political vacuum. The Plan is not "dead". One of the unnoticed features of the joint statement issued in Zagreb on 25 April was the establishment of a coordination body by the Croats and the Muslims to work on the implementation of the Plan to the extent possible, considering the character of the provisions and the present circumstances. I went to great lengths at my meetings with Tudjman, Izetbegovic and Boban to get them to end the particularly nasty fighting in Central Bosnia and hope that this agreement signed in Zagreb will help achieve that.
In the wider context, during my meetings with Tudjman I pressed him to use all his efforts to reach an agreement with the Bosnian Serbs and not to take any precipitate action. Efforts to take the matter forward will continue at talks to be held with them later this week in Geneva. There is no doubt that the situations in Bosnia and Croatia are very closely inter-related and the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be at the least contained at the lowest possible level and not allowed to spill over. Milosevic must exercise his influence over the Croatian Serbs to prevent his happening.
David Owen"
ICFY NOTE ON LORD OWEN'S VISIT TO PARIS; 27 APRIL 1993
1. Lord Owen met Prime Minister Balladur and Foreign Minister Jupp for almost one hour on 27 April. Prior to this he attended a meeting with senior French officials from the Quai, the Elysee, the Matignon and the MOD, and chaired by the head of the French diplomatic service. The same ground was covered in both meetings.
2. Balladur, who at all times expressed his ideas clearly and precisely and focused the conversation on the fundamental issues, began by thanking Lord Owen for his efforts. French interest in the situation was intense. It was the biggest troop contributor and was naturally deeply concerned about any developments which could further endanger the security of its forces. Lord Owen welcomed the consistent French support for his efforts and especially noted the importance of their decision to push ahead with a vote on UNSCR 820. This had greatly improved his negotiating position in Belgrade. The process was now at a potentially very important stage. Just as Karadzic had signed up to the nine principles in January after a split between him and the Serbian and Montenegrin leadership, there were clear signs of another division opening up between Belgrade and Pale. When it came down to it, Milosevic was a pragmatist not an ideologue and he now appeared to have come down in favour of reaching a settlement, as witnessed by his decision to send a joint letter with Cosic and Bulatovic to the Bosnian Serb Assembly recommending acceptance. He realised what failure to reach a settlement in Bosnia meant for Serbia. Pressure now had to be maintained, but we should try to widen the gap by showing sensitivity to genuine Serb concerns. It would be foolish to fuel latent Serbian paranoia and fatalism at a time when there was growing evidence that Belgrade/Yugoslav Serbs were fed up with the policies of the Serbs in Bosnia. France should use its influence over Milosevic to develop the split between him and Karadzic. 3. Preparing for the implementation of the plan was of crucial importance and would have to involve the US. The Europeans, particularly the UK and France should now attempt to draw in the US on the basis of a full partnership. The US could not be allowed to get away with supplying air power and leaving Europe to provide ground forces. There should be a joint effort on air, land and sea, and also politically. Preferably, US troops should be involved even before full implementation begins. A major US contribution to the implementation force would provide a real chance of reaching a settlement. The international community had to avoid being sucked into fighting on behalf of the Muslims, which had always been the Muslim hardliners' aim. The only possibility he saw for military action on their behalf was perhaps threatening to use air power to protect Gorazde. But it would mean stepping on to a very dangerous path. They still hoped that they could have a unitary, Muslim-dominated state, but the international community should never accept this. It was also certain that neither the Croats nor the Serbs would do so, or should have to do so. The Muslims were no doubt victims, but in many cases were also the villains. This had to be brought home to the US where the majority still saw things in black and white terms. Indeed US policy as a whole was worrying. Although coordination had improved recently Clinton was clearly still getting conflicting advice and a lot of emotional arguments were being used. Over the next few weeks Britain and France would have to stick firmly together in their dealings with the US. They should make clear that unilateral action was totally unacceptable and encourage the US to commit itself to providing ground forces in blue helmets to ensure implementation.
4. Jupp said that the basis of the French position was to hold firm on sanctions and they would work on increasing their efficacity. They were greatly concerned that the sanctions provisions were not being applied toughly enough. Lord Owen agreed that sanctions were being extensively avoided. What would really hurt Milosevic quickly were financial sanctions such as those applied against drugs barons. We should follow this course.
5. As regards any further initiatives, Jupp explained that France would want prior notification and consultation so that its troops, who were in the most exposed positions, could be redeployed. France was totally against any unilateral US action which would present them with a fait accompli. This view was firmly backed up by Balladur who also said France was against lifting the arms embargo. But before any military action could be contemplated the political goals that it was designed to bring about had to be clearly defined. Balladur later came back to this "fundamental issue" saying that at the moment the international community seemed uncertain. Lord Owen's response was that the political goal was to implement the Plan in the form accepted by the Security Council, though taking into account the proposal for a ten kilometre wide demilitarised corridor in the north, and to roll-back the Serbs. They could not be allowed to sit on their current front lines. To give the Serbs a territorial corridor would probably get them to sign quickly but would only lead to partition and Lebanonisation of the country. He had tried to be flexible, and in order to meet the concerns of the Bosnian Serb leadership, particularly Mladic, he had proposed that Muslim or Croatian troops would not be allowed to move into Serb towns and villages which had to be vacated by the Bosnian Serb Army.
6. Lord Owen said that finding a solution would be very difficult. The basic mistake had been made in recognising Bosnia in the first place. It would be hard to rectify this mistake but in his view the Plan offered the only way of doing it, although he would welcome any proposed changes or amendments that could improve it. At the moment, there were no other proposals on the table. There was no point in applying pressure in a political vacuum. He totally agreed with the French on this. Milosevic's commitment to a settlement should be tested by demanding that he quickly follows up on the letter to the Bosnian Serb Assembly. He should be asked to support the deployment of UN monitors on the border crossings which, although it might not be immediately effective in cutting off the Bosnian Serb Army, would send a powerful signal to them. He should also provide for their protection by the JA or police, since they would be unarmed. If he did not do this then we should go for interdicting their supply lines, but only within a UN context. Lord Owen also suggested that Milosevic should be told to use his undoubted influence to get the Krajina Serbs to sign up for the 6 April cease fire agreement, and that he should agree that if the Bosnian Serbs interfere with humanitarian supplies, the UN could use force to get them through.
7. Both Balladur and Jupp expressed concern about command and control of any operation. If new initiatives were to be taken, then there would have to be a new SCR. It was for the Security Council to decide on future action and not for any individual state to head off on its own. There also had to be full political control over any action. Jupp said he had been a little surprised by the British position in Copenhagen, where Britain had said that it would be prepared to go ahead with operations "under the auspices of the UN" without a new SCR. Lord Owen replied that after his meeting with Lanxade, a few weeks ago, he fully understood French sensitivities about command and control, but the situation had to be looked at realistically. President Clinton's position with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not strong and if US troops were to be involved on the ground, Powell would require a greater NATO element than France would normally be prepared to accept. He hoped that under the circumstances, the French would be able to live with this, but they should sell greater NATO involvement for a high price - there should be a significant number of US troops on the ground. This was essential if any settlement was to stick. But if US policy turned out to be a mish-mash of ideas such as lifting the arms embargo, limited air strikes, etc, then his advice to the French, and the British, would be to pull out their forces. France and Britain should flatly reject any US attempt to present them with a Presidential decision, dressed up as new proposals. There had to be discussion. It was too serious a question for the Americans to be allowed to dictate policy, particularly since their knowledge of the situation was limited.
8. The question of a reconvened London Conference was also discussed. Lord Owen said that one option might be to have a meeting between the US and EC/NATO members when Cristopher came to Europe, followed a little later by a meeting of the expanded Steering Committee of ICFY at ministerial level, though without the participation of the ex-Yugoslav Republics. This would offer a good forum for discussions since it involved the Russians, some of those countries involved in evading sanctions/or being hardest hit by them, and a number of Islamic countries. The latter could be asked to pledge funds to help those countries most affected by the sanctions to encourage them to stop their evasion activities.
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