| [ previous ] | [ top ] | [ next ] |
COREU FROM LORD OWEN, 20 May 1994
MILOSEVIC RINGS AKASHI, 19 MAY 1994
1. Following Co-Chairmen's meeting in Belgrade on 17th, Milosevic rang Akashi in Zagreb on 19th and said he had taken action following our explanation over what was happening in Gorazde. Milosevic was confident all Serb military would be out of the 3 km zone by Saturday 21st. Akashi has now written to the parties to say he wants to start talks on the cessation of hostilities no later than Monday 23rd. Akashi feels on past experience this may take until Friday 27th before hopes for successful conclusion. This may affect timing of Contact Group meeting with parties. Co-Chairmen negotiating with Croatian Serbs and hoping to arrange early meeting between them and the Croatian government.
HIS EXCELLENCY MR KLAUS KINKEL FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
4 June 1994
SUBJECT: BOSNIA
1. It seems to me we now need to focus on the politics of a deal over Bosnia and Herzegovina and in particular how we persuade President Clinton of the necessity to not only as Saturday's International Herald Tribune says "forge a detailed bottom line peace proposal for Bosnia" but recognise that such a deal has to be backed with a package of disincentives and incentives. It is not in my judgement sufficient to say as the State Department official does in the same newspaper report "we basically offer a solution, but it is up to them to decide whether to accept".
2. Stoltenberg and I had an interesting meeting with Churkin on Thursday who, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, told us that the Russians are broadly content with the working map developed by the Contact Group including elements which I expect to be unacceptable to the Serbs, such as the Serbs relinquishing total control of Visegrad, and the Federation retaining territory on the east bank of the Drina near Gorazde beyond that currently under UN control. Churkin claims to have shown the map to Milosevic who, while saying it was an issue for the Bosnian Serbs, did not proffer any adverse reaction. Milosevic is obviously not going to sell a settlement again as he did in Athens. But for Milosevic and for Churkin, the two key elements are achieving 49-51% and guaranteeing a Northern Corridor for the Serbs. All other considerations are subsidiary.
3. Ambassador Redman, with General Galvin, told Stoltenebrg and I on Friday that he felt the next two weeks were crucial. He felt Churkin would support the map and that "grey areas" involving the UN would be necessary, particularly around Prijedor. Given the shortage of UN personnel to man the ceasefire line, we all agree that any areas of UN Administration will have to be kept to the minimum.
4. Michael Steiner will brief you on what is happening in the Contact Group but there are some signs that Ambassador Redman is not yet ready to go firm on the map saying he needs more time in Washington. I hope you will support a very early meeting of the Contact Group at Ministerial level since maintaining the momentum of this negotiation is crucial and I believe only Warren Christopher and President Clinton can make the political decisions particularly on those parts of the map which will not be liked by the Bosnian Government.
5. This map will be a bitter pill for all the Bosnian parties. The US, EU, Russia and the UN will have to put their full weight behind the map, if it is to gain acceptance and exploit the albeit limited leverage they have to the full, and offer real incentives for acceptance. It seems to me politically inconcievable that governments can now just leave such a map on the table as happened to the VOPP in January 1993.
6. We suggested to Churkin letting the Federation know that if they accepted the map and associated constitutional arrangements, and the Serbs did not, the arms embargo would be lifted and under UN resolutions NATO air assets would do all they could to prevent the Serbs taking military advantage. Most if not all UN ground forces and UNHCR personnel would have to be withdrawn during this period. This is essentially "lift and strike" which should appeal to Clinton, but with two crucial differences: first, that it would be air action threatened against a specific peace plan, which was not the case when first suggested by the US, and second, that it would be air action which has Russian support.
7. The Serbs could be told that sanctions will be suspended if they accept the map and associated constitutional arrangements, even if the Federation refuse to sign, and the Serbs could also be told the arms embargo would not be lifted.
8. If the fighting continued, either the Federation or the Serbs, whichever had not signed up, could opt for peace at any time. A major advantage is the UN would not be applying air strikes in a political vacuum. A potential problem for Clinton is that Christopher's February 1993 statement talked about not imposing a settlement. The way around that would be to say that we are not imposing a settlement, which is literally true since the Bosnian parties would be doing the ground fighting but we would be providing incentives and disincentives to the parties to settle. 9. Only Clinton in my view has the political instincts in the US Administration sufficient to want to cut a deal, as he showed over the bureaucratic in-fighting and suggested compromise over favoured nation trade with China.
10. There is no guarantee that the Russian position as espoused by Churkin will remain as flexible much longer. Yeltsin's personal involvement seems crucial and without needing a Heads of Government meeting, Moscow could be a venue for the next meeting of the Contact Group at Ministerial level. At such a meeting the parties could be asked to attend, having been given the map and associated consitution for consultation prior to signature. There should be no bogus wartime referenda or going back for Assembly ratification.
11. The risk of bringing these matters to a head is of igniting the war not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in Croatia. But that is now a very real risk anyhow, even if we achieve a cessation of hostilities agreement. The Bosnian Serbs are deliberately coinciding the cessation of hostilities and map negotiations. If these negotiations fail, Bosnian Serbs and Croatian Serbs are ready to merge politically and militarily. Tudjman is coming under increasing pressure not to renew the UN mandate this September. The existing UN mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina next winter, and for Croatia in the UNPAs, will anyhow be ever harder to fulfil and the calls for air strikes likely to multiply.
12. No one can be happy with any strategy which risks having to engage air power against the Bosnian Serbs and maybe the Croatian Serbs. But we are already under that risk and over the last few months have only just avoided punitive air strikes, first over Sarajevo, then over Gorazde, and most recently over Brcko. On each of these occasions we would have used NATO airpower without a peace settlement being in place, without Russian support for the air strikes, and in a dangerously reactive deployment with UN forces still on the ground.
13. I have sent a somewhat similar message to Alain Juppe and Douglas Hurd in the hope that Prime Minister Major and President Mitterand might speak to President Clinton along these lines.
COREU, 8 June, 1994, Co-Chairmen's talks with Croatian Serbs leader, Martic, Geneva, 7 June, 1994
Subject: Krajina
Stoltenberg and I met Milan Martic the self styled President of the "RSK" and Slobodan Jarcevic in Geneva for nearly five hours today.
The end result is an agreement to hold a meeting in Plitvice on 16 June with the possibility of going on until 17 June. The meeting will be chaired for ICFY by Ahrens and Eide. I contacted Sarinic in Zagreb and he has agreed to attend.
1. The first item on the agenda will hopefully be a pre-packaged deal involving water from the Serbs to Croats in Zadar and hopefully some water from the Croats to some Serb villages and the return by the Croats of the Obrovac generator poles which make the power station work. The other items on the agenda proposed by the Serbs are:
2. high voltage grid (the Serbs expect payment either in oil or hard currency not the Kuna for their electricity)
3. oil pipeline (the Serbs want oil to be able to go to Pancevo in Serbia for refining, we will check this out with the Sanctions Committee but we are unlikely to be able to reach an accommodation)
4. pensions (the Serbs want 57,000 people to be paid in any hard currency except the Kuna). The Croats are most unlikely to put such a large amount of money into the economy of the Krajina without some progress on the political questions and the Serbs know this.
5. Security Council Resolution 820. Here the problem is para 12 which prohibits the Croatian Serbs from trading without Croatian approval. The Croats are most unlikely to support action in the Security Council on this though in reality it is a very odd provision. Without movement on Resolution 820 the Serbs say they will not agree to open the Zagreb-Belgrade motorway nor to any large concessions over tourism.
The Croats may want to add other items to the agenda. It has been tentatively agreed that a second meeting will take place on 30 June. The Co-Chairmen have agreed to use their good offices with Akashi over ceasefire violations which in truth are coming from both sides though the overall agreement is holding. We can only keep our fingers crossed that the meeting on 16 June will take place. If it does it will be the first meeting outside the Russian Embassy in Croatia. The main problem is that the Croatian Serbs are not going to even contemplate giving up their claim for total independence until they see what happens to the Bosnian Serbs. Only in the wake of an agreement in Bosnia will we be able to make progress over Croatia but unfortunately the Catch 22 is that we may well need progress in Croatia in order to help us reach an agreement in Bosnia. This is particularly so if Brcko remains the sticking point that it currently is. I still hanker after a minor territorial adjustment above the Sava around Brcko, above Dubrovnik, and involving access to the sea to Prevlaka. A deal here will of course require Milosevic to recognise the boundaries of Croatia and his refusal to do this reflects the reaction of the Croatian Serbs.
COREU FROM ICFY, 8 June 1994
The following agreement was signed by Ganic, Akmadzic and Koljevic on the afternoon of Wednesday 8 June.
1. As a first step towards a comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, both sides in the conflict agree not to engage in any offensive military operations or other provocative actions of any kind for a period of one month starting from 10 June 1994 at 1200 hours local time.
2. This period of military stabilisation is required in order to give time for reflection leading to a resumption, within the next several days, under UNPROFOR auspices, of negotiations on a comprehensive cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, the immediate and complete release of all persons detained including prisoners of war, and of all information already available on persons whose whereabouts are unknown, as soon as possible under the supervision and in accordance with the plan of action of the ICRC, will be implemented.
3. UNPROFOR will continue to monitor and report all military activity along the present line of conflict.
COREU FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN, 12 July 1994
Visit of the ICFY Co-Chairmen to Belgrade and Zagreb: 11 July 1994
1. The Co-Chairmen met Milosevic and former President Cosic in Belgrade on 11 July, before travelling to Zagreb for meetings with Tudjman and Akashi.
2. With both Milosevic and Cosic the Co-Chairmen emphasised the level of international support for the Contact Group's proposal. Yeltsin had made his views particularly clear at Naples. The map would stand, unless there were mutually agreed changes. The Russians were very wary of making any border changes, even minor ones, in Bosnia or in Croatia. The time had come for the Bosnian Serbs to take a decision. The US was confident that the Muslims would give an unambiguous yes to the proposal: a Serb "Yes, but..." would be interpreted as a no, with tragic consequences. Both Co-Chairmen made it clear that the international community expected a response on 19 July; the Serbs should be wary about Kozyrev's alleged statement that unofficially there would be another week after this date for further consultations. The Bosnian Serbs must not misjudge the mood.
3. Milosevic agreed the Bosnian Serbs were perhaps not fully aware of the time pressures, but he himself felt "the time for buts was behind". He would see Karadzic, Krajisnik and Koljevic that evening and try to influence them as best he could, but his influence was limited. Cosic, who remains in close contact with the Bosnian Serbs and was well briefed by them on the Contact Group's proposals, also promised to use what influence he had. Cosic believed there was a real danger of splits in the Bosnian Serb leadership between the military and civilian sides. There was also a danger of local leaders refusing to accept central authority, and the whole situation degenerating in to chaos. Milosevic, who was sober and realistic about the prospects for the Bosnian Serbs accepting the map, agreed that such risks existed. He said he had warned Karadzic not to present too negative a picture of the proposals as this would only encourage the Serbs to reject it. The mood in the Republika Srpska was not good.
4. Cosic mentioned three main problem areas for the Bosnian Serbs, in addition to the Northern Corridor:
-constitution -Sarajevo -access to the sea
These were also taken up in the conversation with Milosevic. On the constitution, the Co-Chairmen explained the idea of the loose Union, which was not challenged by either Milosevic or Cosic. Cosic stressed the importance of the Bosnian Serbs being able to have a confederal relationship with Serbia, just as the Federation could have with Croatia. The Co-Chairmen said that this was envisaged for the Federation and there was no reason it could not apply to the Republika Srpska's relationship with the FRY.
5. Milosevic and Cosic attached great importance to resolving the question of Sarajevo and raised the question of land swaps involving the eastern enclaves. The Co-Chairmen pointed out that agreed changes were acceptable, and indeed the international community would welcome a "home grown" solution to this problem. But the Serbs had to be much bolder than they had been up till now. Milosevic clearly understood this point, and is likely to concentrate now on trying to make progress on this.
6. Lord Owen mentioned that Karadzic had attached great importance to access to the sea at Prevlaka when he met him in Geneva last week, and other members of the Serb leadership, especially Plavsic, had made public statements about this. He asked if a deal could be done with Tudjman involving Prevlaka, land above Dubrovnik. He made a distinction between this and possibly also including land above Brcko which could help resolve the Northern Corridor issue, but which would be much harder for Tudjman to move on without an overall settlement in the Krajina. The price for Tudjman accepting Prevlaka would be mutual recognition of Croatia and the FRY. Both Milosevic and Cosic were very cautious on this. Milosevic is worried about being accused of betraying the Krajina Serbs. He was adamant that the only way forward is the three stage process, ceasefire, economic cooperation, political negotiations. He seemed to be unwilling to concede recognition of Croatia, but Lord Owen feels that this is not a totally fixed position and that he could be persuaded that Prevlaka was essential for Bosnian Serb acceptance, particularly if Krajisnik blocked any imaginative moves over Sarajevo.
7. Akashi was hopeful that he could finalise an extension of the cessation of hostilities on 12 July, though Ganic was being difficult. The anti-UNPROFOR campaign, which is becoming more disruptive, is causing great annoyance, and the UN has made it clear to Tudjman that this will effect the renewal of the mandate. This seems to be having some effect on Tudjman.
8. Akashi's main anxiety is that NATO planning is not taking enough account of the Bosnian Serbs reluctance to work with UNPROFOR, let alone NATO, and stressed the difficulties of making any progress in Sarajevo or on the demilitarization of Brcko if these operations are not clearly under UNPROFOR control. Akashi is very pleased that the former deputy force Commander, Macinnes, is returning to UNPROFOR to work with the NATO liaison team, and that he would also be getting extra planning staff. Akashi was worried that NATO's arrival would lead to his authority being superseded. Lord Owen confirmed that the EU troop contributors and certainly the Canadians and Scandinavians as well would expect Akashi to continue to represent UNPROFOR's interests, and that the dual key system would remain in place. The FYROM was discussed and it was agreed that if the sanctions regime had to be toughened, Gligorov would need a generous financial package, and there should be strengthening of UNPROFOR's presence.
9. At the meeting with Tudjman, it became clear that recognition of Croatia was an absolute and he would not entertain a Prevlaka/Dubrovnik exchange without it. With recognition, Tudjman would be flexible on many aspects, and as on HMS Invincible might provide the key compromises to Serb acceptance. Lord Owen will be briefing orally Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe before their visit, which is very well timed. They are likely to face probing questions about the constitution and also on lifting of sanctions, particularly UNSCR 820. There is no doubt that it would help Milosevic to distance himself from the Bosnian Serbs if sanctions affecting sporting and cultural links could be suspended at the same time as those affecting civilian air passenger travel. Cosic confirmed that Milosevic is putting great pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. In his view Milosevic is being too aggressive, and this is proving counter-productive. Publicly Milosevic is at pains to show that he is leaving the issue to the Bosnian Serbs. Fortunately that is not the case, but he will be wary of breaking publicly with them as he did in May 1993 over the VOPP. But it is still something to be played for.
COREU FROM LORD OWEN, 22 July 1994
FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS ONLY
BOSNIA: CHALLENGE TO CFSP
1. The EU is now facing its first real challenge to its CFSP over the former Yugoslavia. Letting the VOPP be ditched last May was just about defensible. The Clinton administration had never been supportive to it and European/US relations were deteriorating. The Co-chairmen's authority could be weakened, provided it was reinforced by a greater EU ministerial involvement, which started in June in the Copenhagen Summit and led on to the EU Action Plan. Nevertheless there were serious consequences of allowing the Bosnian Serbs in May 1993 to call the EU's bluff. One of those was the undermining of Milosevic's authority with the Bosnian Serbs following his overt support for the VOPP and his half hearted gesture towards closing the border.
2. Now in the summer of 1994 allowing the Bosnian Serbs to call our bluff again is far more dangerous. Firstly the authority of the EU itself is on the line and secondly there is no Co-Chairmen's proposal to act as a buffer. Also the US, by continuing to advocate lift and strike, have cleverly contrived their own escape hatch. While the Russians, already in problems with their Duma, can just shrug their shoulders, saying they tried their best. The EU has, therefore, by far the most to lose from a failure of the Contact Group. Not just politically, but also militarily for EU member states are exposed on the ground as UN peace keepers. These peacekeepers face an increasing danger of being sucked in as combatants, since the US is clearly trying to arrange a progressive pattern of air strikes that seriously risk the UN, and the EU by implication, in to a lift, stay and strike policy.
3. The key as always is Milosevic. He understands power and he will only pressurize the Bosnian Serbs further if the Contact Group convince him that they are serious. He must receive a sharp reminder as a result of the Ministerial Contact Group meeting that we expect him to act against the Bosnian Serbs, and that if he does not deliver, we will take further action against him. This means Milosevic being well aware of the contents of two draft UN resolutions over sanctions by the end of this month, one of which encourages him to isolate the Bosnian Serbs, the other of which shows him the heavy price he will pay for a failure to cooperate.
4. There is only one threatened action which Milosevic will respect, and that is if the resolution addresses the closure of Serbia's border with Macedonia. We have the power to do it, and it will be seen as pusillanimous behaviour if we do not both threaten this and clearly mean to carry it out. The latest figures for traffic across the border show 1018 trucks and 148 railway wagons going north in one week, and 1173 trucks and 351 railway wagons going south. This is an intolerable situation. We know that President Gligorov's freedom to act is circumscribed by the continuing weakness of his economy. Without the black market dealing it would be in an even worse situation. He has to be granted generous financial support immediately, and the vehicle to use is Article 50 of the UN Charter, and a Security Council Resolution taken under Chapter VII, which will automatically bind all European Union States. There will also have to be a simultaneous strengthening of the UN presence in Macedonia. Any other action on sanctions, be it further attempts to free Serbian assets or demands on the neighbouring governments, will not be taken seriously either by those governments or by the rest of the world.
5. The second fundamental sanctions issue is to deal with Serb extraction of oil from the wells in the Djeletovci area in the eastern UNPA. UNPROFOR in UNPA East think that there are currently 12 wells operating over an area of 5-10km. The estimated production varies from 300-400 tons per day. Accurate information is impossible to obtain as the Serbs deny all access to this area. The oil is moved by a pipeline under the Danube (which existed before the war began) for refining in Serbia either at Novi Sad or Pancevo, just outside Belgrade. The refined products are moved by road. Serbia charges for the refining and is paid in food. Karadzic openly boasts that all this oil comes back through the Republika Srpska either for their use, or for onward shipment to the RSK, and there is every reason to believe that this is the case. We cannot be sure that even if Milosevic seals the border, some oil will not get across. There is an overwhelming case for passing a Security Council Resolution that oil production in the Djeletovci area should cease and UNPROFOR should be given all necessary powers under Chapter VII to ensure that no oil passes down the pipeline. If we find that UNPROFOR does not have the military capacity to deal with this, then this is a further case for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, so as to free us up to use air power to tilt the balance in favour of the Croatian army within the borders we have recognised for Croatia, and for the Bosnian Government army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6. It is my conviction that unless we can persuade Milosevic to act against the Bosnian Serbs we have no option but to remove the UN from both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina soon and to follow a lift and strike policy before the winter closes in and the weather makes air strikes less effective, and the humanitarian situation deteriorates. The longer we delay a decision to remove the UN, the more we are closing the air strike option and accepting we just have to muddle through another winter. But can we really envisage holding the present line for another 9 months? I believe the risks of being sucked in on the ground in this strategy are even greater.
7. Adopting lift and strike now, as opposed to when the US first proposed it, is a very different strategy. Now we have a concrete plan to which we can hold the Muslims, and one to which the Russians as well as the US are firmly committed. Provided air strikes are limited to Bosnian Serb territory, the Russians ought to be able to tolerate them, and there is little risk that they will feel driven to put their aircraft in to Serbia. If the Croat and the Muslim forces are not sufficiently strong with outside air power, then the world will have to live with a Serb imposed solution. At least both the Croatian and Bosnian governments are in a far better position in 1994 to stand up against the Serbs than they have been at any time since the fighting began in 1991. It will have to be very clearly stated that NATO will not under any circumstances put troops in on the ground, and that the Muslims and Croats will have to live with the consequences of a strategy which they have asked for, whereby they do the ground fighting, and over which many NATO nations have military doubts as to the efficacy of air strikes. The alternative, in the absence of Milosevic cooperating, is to watch the progressive erosion of the authority of the Contact Group nations and a situation in which the Serbs assert their authority with the world never knowing whether or not the route suggested by the US could have been successful.
ICFY Memorandum 31 July on responses to the Contact Group proposals from the Bosnian parties
In evaluating the responses of the Bosnian parties to the territorial proposal presented to them on 6 July by the Contact Group, the ministers underscored their firm belief that the principles for a settlement set forth in their communiqu of 13 May and the territorial proposal reviewed by the ministers at their 5 July meeting in Geneva offer a reasonable and realistic basis for a settlement.
In this regard, the ministers reaffirmed the importance of achieving a settlement that preserves Bosnia and Herzegovina as a union within its internationally recognized borders, while providing for constitutional arrangements that establish the relationship between the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities. They also expressed their firm view that the settlement should provide for refugees and displaced persons to have the possibility to return freely to their homes of origin. The ministers welcomed the Bosniac-Croat delegation's acceptance of the Contact Group proposal and urged the Bosnian government to maintain its commitment to this proposal and to a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Bosnia.
The ministers expressed their profound regret that the Bosnian Serb delegation did not accept the Contact Group proposal. They called on the Bosnian Serb leadership to urgently reconsider their response and to provide a clear acceptance of the Contact Group proposal.
The ministers emphasized that acceptance of the Contact Group proposal is the essential first step for achieving an equitable and balanced overall settlement covering all relevant issues, and that they are determined to use incentives and disincentives as agreed on 5 July to this end. In this regard, the ministers reaffirmed that acceptance of the Contact Group proposal will bring important benefits for all parties.
Against this background, the ministers:
1. agreed that proposals will be put to the Security Council to extend sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and tighten enforcement of the existing sanctions regime. They agreed that a draft resolution to this effect should be submitted to the Security Council as soon as possible for early adoption.
2. decided that, simultaneously, as agreed 5 July, a draft resolution concerning suspension of sanctions will be prepared, to be submitted to the Security Council immediately upon acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs of the Contact Group map.
3. underlined the need for vigorous action to prevent sanction violations across borders, and agreed that international cooperation with the neighbouring states should be developed to promote strict enforcement of the sanctions regime.
4. called on all parties to respect the cease-fire, demanded an immediate end to attacks and provocation against UN personnel and the UN airlift operation, condemned in strongest terms the taking of UN personnel as hostages, and insisted that freedom of movement for UNPROFOR be respected.
5. warned against any renewed effort to effect the strangulation of Sarajevo.
6. expressed their commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas and requested finalization of planning to permit strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones, including at each stage appropriate provision for the safety of UNPROFOR troops.
The ministers reiterated that in the event of continuing rejection of the Contact Group proposal, as a last resort a decision in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo could become unavoidable. They also agreed that this would have consequences for the presence of UNPROFOR.
Noting the wider situation in the former Yugoslavia and the importance of addressing the fundamental causes of instability in the region, the ministers urged mutual recognition between all states of the former Yugoslavia. They support the immediate resumption of talks between the Croatian government and local Serb authorities in the United Nations protected areas.
The ministers will monitor the situation closely and agreed to continue their common effort to achieve a political settlement and, meanwhile, to prevent the conflict from spreading.
annex ii.
Our declaration should be interpreted as an indication of our agreement with a significant part of the proposed territorial delimitation, and as being positive towards the continuation of negotiations on that basis. In the light of this, the Republic of Srpska is expressing its willingness to resume, immediately, negotiations with the Contact Group.
COREU FROM LORD OWEN, 31 AUGUST 1993
Ministerial Meeting on Former Yugoslavia in Geneva on July 30 1994
Summary:
Troika of foreign ministers met with Foreign Minister Hurd, US Foreign Minister Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in American mission in Geneva for 'Geneva iii' meeting on 30 July. Ministers agreed that the reply of the Bosnian Serb to the peace plan of the Contact Group was tantamount to a rejection. As was to be expected, difficult discussions about the conclusions to draw in this situation showed the fragility of the consensus reached in the Contact Group. Russia withdrew its preliminary acceptance of the inclusion of the Krajina question in the sanctions suspension mechanism. The US asked for strict enforcement and extension of the exclusion zones. France, UK and Russia underlined in this context their concerns regarding the security of their troops on the ground. The US made it clear that they were under strong pressure to lift the arms embargo. Ministers agreed on the annexed communiqu (annex i). The Co-Chairmen attended the second half of the meeting.
Report:
Ministers proceeded on an assessment of the replies given by the parties. They reached agreement that, while the answer of the Federation was an unconditional 'yes', the reply given by the Bosnian Serbs could not be considered sufficient. A declaration of the Bosnian Serbs, given to Minister Papoulias on the occasion of his recent visit to Pale (annex ii), cold not change this assessment. The expectation that the Bosnian Serbs would modify their position at the last moment and maybe only for tactical reasons, had not been realised.
All ministers underlined that their united front had to be maintained. Ministers agreed that the process had to go on and that the Serbs would continue to have the possibility to change their position. The discussion on the conclusions to draw from the assessment of the parties' replies showed, however, clearly and not altogether surprisingly the fragility of the consensus. The Presidency (Kinkel) stressed the need to maintain unity and to show firmness. Kinkel expressed scepticism regarding the effects of a lifting of the arms embargo and said that Germany shared the European position on this issue.
It was agreed that a draft United Nations Security Council -resolution on the tightening of sanctions should be submitted to the Security Council within one week. Christopher said that the US would propose measures against off-shore companies owned by the FRY, by at least cutting transfers to the FRY. It was stated by the EU-side that some disagreement existed on this as well as on other details, but the possibility of FRY profiting from such companies should be avoided. Furthermore, the need was stressed, particularly at the border FRY/FYROM. The Contact Group was instructed to get in touch with the FYROM government and other front-line states and convey the determination to promote the strict enforcement of the sanctions. Greece stressed in this context the serious consequences the sanctions had on the weak economies in the region.
Kozyrev, who had not commented on the draft Security Council resolution on sanctions tightening, insisted, however, that a draft Security Council Resolution on suspension had to be prepared simultaneously, to clearly show Belgrade the alternatives. Kozyrev repeatedly stated that the suspension of all sanctions had to be tied to the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs. This excludes any link with the Krajina and is clearly not acceptable for the US.
Ministers agreed that the planning to permit strict enforcement and extension of exclusion zones (para. 6 of communiqu) should be finalized in August. Hurd underlined in this context that the 'dual key' for military actions had to be maintained. Air power could not be used against the recommendation of the Commander on the ground. The measures envisaged might make the further presence of UNPROFOR very difficult. Juppe insisted that the planning concerning possible consequences for UNPROFOR had also to be finalized in August. Kozyrev said that air strikes carried out by NATO would put Russia in a delicate position as non-member of the alliance. The Russian UNPROFOR contingent would have to be withdrawn in that event.
Christopher underlined that the pressure in the US to lift the arms embargo would become irresistible if the Bosnian Serbs maintained their rejection of the Contact Group plan. He mentioned in this context also the proposals in Congress to unilaterally lift the embargo. The EU-side underlined their concerns regarding a lifting of the embargo.
Papoulias reported about his recent visit to Belgrade and Pale. He had seen Milosevic as well as Karadzic, Koljevic, Krajisnik and Buha. The Bosnian Serbs had handed over the declaration included in annex ii. In Papoulias' view, Milosevic had accepted the peace plan and was bringing pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to do the same.
Kozyrev, supported by Papoulias, advocated early meetings of the parties, particularly between Milosevic and Tudjman. Ministers considered whether possible differences between Belgrade and Pale could be exploited. Lord Owen strongly recommended to go this way.
annex i.
Communiqu of the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva, 30 July 1994
The Foreign Ministers of Germany, Greece and France and the European Union Commissioner for External Affairs (representing the Troika of the European Union), the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom and the U.S. Secretary of State, together with the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, met in Geneva on 30 July.
| [ previous ] | [ top ] | [ next ] |