Notes

COREU, 15 April 1994

CO-CHAIRMEN'S VISIT TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: 12-14 APRIL

SUMMARY

1. Intense talks over 2 days in Zagreb and Sarajevo. UN, US and Russian representatives believe chance for reaching overall cessation of hostilities missed because of Serb action in Gorazde. Mood of Serbs intensely anti-UN. Insist they will make no concessions. Eventually persuaded to meet Akashi, but no guarantee that this will mark resumption of regular contacts with UNPROFOR. If and when the process gets back on the rails, there still remains a lot to be done. Meanwhile the situation on the ground is deteriorating and chances of further use of CAS are increasing.

DETAIL

2. On arrival in Zagreb on 12 April we met Akashi and deputy force commander General Macinnis. The following day we travelled to Sarajevo where we met General Rose, Redman and Churkin, Silajdzic and Izetbegovic before leaving for Pale where we saw Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership.

3. The prime concern of all we spoke to in Zagreb and Sarajevo was how to get the peace process back on track following the use of close air support in Gorazde. Rose, Redman and Churkin emphasised that at the weekend they had felt an agreement on an overall cessation of hostilities had been in their grasp. Redman had worked hard on Izetbegovic and Silajdzic to get them to accept a four months cessation, rather than two, and Izetbegovic himself told us he could have accepted longer. There had been a sea change in Izetbegovic's position, probably because the message from the American military that they could not win the war was finally getting through. Izetbegovic told us that if he could take back territories by force, he would do, but he did not think this was possible, and so had decided to seek a negotiated solution, though the parameters of such a solution had to be as before - a just settlement with return of Muslim territories taken by force. But events in Gorazde had derailed this.

4. No one could fully explain why the Serbs had launched the assault on Gorazde at this juncture. It seemed madness, at a time when their long time aim of an overall cessation of hostilities could have been achieved. Even Silajdzic admitted it could have been the result of the military getting out of control, though he and Izetbegovic thought it most likely to have been preplanned, and part of the Serb strategy of trying to force them to the negotiating table. Churkin suggested that a compromise be sought to help the Serbs climb down. A first stage would be the deployment of UNMOs on the right bank of the Drina. This could be followed by the interpositioning of UN forces and we agreed to follow this up with both sides. Silajdzic said it was now "impossible" to discuss the ceasefire until the Serbs withdrew from Gorazde, something which Rose and even Redman were sceptical could now take place. Both Silajdzic and Izetbegovic criticised the UN action in Gorazde. Silajdzic said it had been too little, and Izetbegovic claimed reports from the UNMOs on the ground had been doctored before they got to New York in order to downplay the significance of the attack. Stoltenberg undertook to check up on these reports. We also pointed out that the Serbs were concerned about the BiHA using the Gorazde pocket to launch attacks on the Serbs, and to drive a corridor to the Sanjak. Izetbegovic dismissed claims of Muslim aspirations to link up with the Sanjak as ludicrous. Izetbegovic requested our assistance in getting a food and medicine supply convoy into Sarajevo, and also in organising the evacuation of some 70-100 severely wounded. We agreed to take this up with the Serbs.

5. Although the atmosphere at the meeting with the Serbs was good, there was no doubt of the depth of their antipathy towards the UN and General Rose in particular. Karadzic, who had just returned from a front line visit with Mladic took the hardest line, perhaps for the benefit of those such as "Prime Minister" Lukic who had not taken part in our meetings previously. There was a lot of talk about how they had deliberately not yet sought to shoot at any NATO planes, had deliberately not locked on their radar to them, but it was quite clear that they were coming close to the time when they would authorise the military to shoot at NATO aircraft and were confident that they would down some. Krajisnik somewhat surprisingly took a slightly more conciliatory line than Karadzic, whose starting position was that the Serbs had no further need of UNPROFOR, which he described as an occupying force, and that Rose had cheated and deceived them. Their criticism was mainly focussed on Rose, whom they seemed to hold personally responsible for the air strikes, and Akashi escaped fairly lightly, though was criticised for reneging on the deal brokered by the Russians on Serb monitors being placed on Tuzla airport. This remains a very sensitive issue for them.

6. Stoltenberg and I stressed that the decision to use close air support was fully in keeping with UNPROFOR's mandate, and not the personal decision of general Rose. We took them through the full sequence of events leading up to the bombings, emphasising that they had been given numerous warnings, and also pointed out that the Serb artillery had specifically targeted the positions of the UN monitors, which had been announced to them in advance. It was a clear cut case. We made the point that UNPROFOR had actually retaliated more against Muslim and Croat forces than Serbs. It was in the Serb interests to have good relations with UNPROFOR. Having UN observers on the Serb side of confrontation lines would allow any Muslim provocations to be pinpointed. The Serbs were insistent that the international community was against them. They had to be treated as equals. They went through the usual litany on sanctions, and it took a great deal of effort to keep attention focussed on the immediate issues.

7. Eventually, after over five hours of talks, we persuaded Karadzic that it would be in his interests to see Akashi. He will do this on Friday, following the meeting of the civilian "Supreme Command" which will discuss the future relationship with UNPROFOR. Stoltenberg will accompany Akashi. We also urged Karadzic to consider the positioning of UNMOs on his side of the confrontation line at Gorazde and to allow the entry of the humanitarian convoy requested by Izetbegovic and the medical evacuation. He in turn requested progress on the previously agreed Tarcin/Kula POW exchange, and the 400-700 Serbs remaining in Gorazde being allowed to leave. He remained adamant that the Serbs will not withdraw or make any other concessions. I also raised with Karadzic the case of a Dutch UNMO who has gone missing.

8. Regarding an overall settlement, as we know, the Serbs made it clear that they would not join the Federation, but said they could consider joining a Union. Before hand they wanted either lifting of sanctions or recognition of the Republika Srpska. I raised the possibility of phased withdrawals from Serb occupied territory taking place following a cessation of hostilities but prior to an overall agreement on territory, which could take some time to negotiate. This was not ruled out.

SARAJEVO

9. There are signs that Izetbegovic is now ready to consider UN administration of Sarajevo, so long as some guarantees are given about having a specific "capital area" for the administration of the Federation and any future Union. When we raised this with the Serbs, Krajisnik said Izetbegovic had only changed his mind because he had told Silajdzic a few days previously that UN administration was now out of the question for the Serbs.

MOSTAR

10. Izetbegovic was keen for the EU administration of Mostar to begin as soon as possible. He stressed that the EU should operate in close coordination with the UN and any deployment of personnel should be balanced.

11. Mr Stoltenberg and I will be in Belgrade this evening for a meeting with President Milosevic when we will seek his support to cool the Bosnian Serbs down.

Notes

BY COREU, 19 April 1994

PERSONAL FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS

FROM LORD OWEN

BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP FOR NEGOTIATIONS

1. In the light of yesterday's FAC, Stoltenberg and I have now decided that in view of the extra work likely to be generated by the next phase of the negotiations we should nominate a Contact Group of negotiators to work with the US and Russian Federation. The team from ICFY, representing both the UN and EU, will be composed of our deputy, at present Ambassador Masset, soon to be replaced by Ambassador De Sedouy, and our legal adviser, Paul Szasz, and additionally newly recruited to the team David Manning, an expert on Slav affairs and a Russian speaker, and Michael Steiner who has been closely involved with the Conference's work for some time and took part in ICFY negotiating sessions with the Croats and Muslims in December and January. My Private Secretary would attend and act as the coordinating secretary for the ICFY part of the Contact Group.

2. They will be ready to meet at the earliest opportunity.

Notes

Lord Owen, COREU, Co-Chairmen's talks in Moscow, 20 April, 1995

Summary

1. Kozyrev and Churkin searching for a way forward. Fully behind the idea of closer four-way coordination - U.S., Russian, E.U., U.N. - and establishment of a contact group. Frustrated by U.S. approach, and in particular U.S. concentration on the military option. Co-Chairmen stress need to develop a broad structure of an overall package with both carrots and sticks encompassing military, sanctions and territorial elements which could be presented to the parties. In context of implementing such a package, might be possible to get Russian support for military actions. Churkin believes Mladic leading influence among Bosnian Serbs and now out of control.

2. The Co-Chairmen had a working dinner with Kozyrev and Churkin on 20 April followed by a press conference. During their meeting Kozyrev spoke on the telephone to both Christopher and Rybkin (speaker of the Duma).

3. Kozyrev welcomed the idea of brining the four leading players - U.S., Russia, E.U., U.N. - together and asked how they might take the peace process forward. Lord Owen said that the facts of the situation in Bosnia were well-known to all concerned. Further contacts with the parties would add little new. Left to their own devices they would never reach agreement. What the four had to do was agree the basis for a fair settlement including the map and put forward a package which embraced the military, sanctions and territorial elements and set-out the rewards for acceptance and the penalties for rejection. If necessary this could involve the use of further military action but such action should not be in a vacuum. Presenting a fair package could once again split the Serbs. Milosevic was much more interested in having sanctions lifted than in continuing the war needlessly. We should capitalise on this. The Co-Chairmen told Kozyrev that it would be very helpful if Russia could say that it could agree to the use of military force and support of such a settlement perhaps in a letter from Yeltsin to Clinton. The U.S. would value this highly. The Co-Chairmen believe that given the right package Russian support could be forthcoming but Kozyrev did not give a clear answer on this. Kozyrev was clearly concerned that the U.S. was only interested in stepping up military action and was not looking at the overall settlement. Churkin asked whether the Co-Chairmen thought lifting the arms embargo would be an alternative to use of air strikes. Lord Owen said that he thought NATO would go ahead with planning for that option anyway and lifting the arms embargo would further complicate the whole situation.

4. Kozyrev and Churkin both welcomed the establishment of a Contact Group and were in favour of it meeting immediately. However, when Kozyrev spoke to Christopher during the meeting he was told that the U.S. were not prepared to send representatives to Moscow until NATO had taken a decision in response to the UNSG's request for air strikes: the U.S. also needed more time to prepare their position. The Co-Chairmen said that pressure should be kept on the Americans for an early meeting. Churkin asked whether the E.U. and Russia should meet initially without the Americans. The Co-Chairmen did not rule this out but cautioned that we should not do anything which might drive the Americans away. Kozyrev said that the Contact Group could do useful work on the maps which would be a key issue, and the Co-Chairmen agreed that in any case Masset and Ludlow should stay in Moscow tomorrow for discussions on the map with Churkin and Nikiforov. Kozyrev also thought that the contact group could do useful work in preparing for a ministerial, or even Heads of Government meeting.

5. Churkin asked whether the Co-Chairmen thought it was still possible to achieve an overall cessation of hostilities. They said it would now almost certainly require a settlement on Gorazde, though with U.S. support might be possible. However, there were elements in the Muslim camp who had no interest in seeing such an agreement and would do their best to suck NATO in further by continuing provocations.

6. As regards Serb intentions both Kozyrev and Churkin described events around Gorazde as complete madness. Mladic was running the show and was out of control. He was lying to everyone. Churkin thought that Karadzic was going along with Mladic but was almost certain Milosevic was not. Churkin was of Krajisnik's influence with the military and said Karadzic was the only one who could control him. Kozyrev believed that Mladic would welcome further air strikes. Lord Owen stressed that if we wanted to overcome Mladic's influence we had to come up with a united front.

7. Kozyrev told the Co-Chairmen that the Duma had not debated Bosnia today and instead had agreed to send a delegation to investigate the situation on the ground, adding that Zhirinovskiy had refused to participate in the official delegation and was sending one of his own. He showed little signs of concern about this and no longer seems to be under heavy domestic pressure.

Notes

COREU FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN 27 April 1994

BOSNIA: FIRST MEETING OF CONTACT GROUP

1. The Contact Group had its first meeting as scheduled this morning (26 April). The Americans were represented by Redman, the Russian Federation by Nikiforov, who was later joined by Churkin, and ICFY by the team announced in Athens Coreu CPE 868. The two and a half hour talks proceeded in a very constructive atmosphere.

2. The Group agreed that its main goals should be defining, through contacts with the parties, a fair settlement and to prepare future meetings at a higher level. There was an exchange of views on the main items of the agenda: cessation of hostilities, map/territorial problems, constitutional aspects and sanctions. All participants agreed on the need for urgent action, and so the Group will travel to Sarajevo and to Pale for meetings with the parties on 28/29 April.

3. During the next two weeks the Group will try to make urgent progress on the diplomatic track, in parallel with efforts to attain an overall cessation of hostilities, and attempt to clarify the current positions of both the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs. They agreed that the Bosnian Croats should also be kept informed of developments. In conducting this first stage of its work, the Group will act in accordance with the EU Action Plan and in the light of the discussion at the 18 April Foreign Affairs Council.

Notes

COREU FROM LORD OWEN, 29 April 1994

PERSONAL FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS

MEETING WITH CHURKIN, OSLO, 29 APRIL

1. Vitaly Churkin at the request of Kozyrev contacted myself and Stoltenberg to arrange an early meeting. We met in Oslo today. The Russians are very concerned to move fast on the diplomatic front. They recognise that during March and April not enough was done to keep the Serbs locked into a negotiated settlement. Specifically they want the Contact Group to prepare for a meeting involving Foreign Ministers and the Co-Chairmen to be followed almost certainly by a further meeting involving Heads of Government.

2. Churkin's detailed proposals are fully compatible with the EU Action Plan. Firstly, he would like a cessation of hostilities with UN forces on the confrontation line. Secondly, he wants withdrawal of Serb forces to a temporary line on a map involving the Federation with 50.8% and Republika Srpska with 49.2%. Thirdly, suspension of economic sanctions once Serb withdrawal complete. Ideally he would like passenger air traffic to be restored to Serbia Montenegro to accompany the cessation of hostilities. Fourthly, after a year if the parties have not reached agreement on a final map he envisages reference back to the International Community for help in reaching an agreement and possible arbitration.

3. Russian thinking is dominated by a concern to check the Bosnian Serb military machine. They clearly fear an outbreak of fighting around Brcko and the northern corridor but equally well flare up in Bihac or in Tuzla. They are not content with a long drawn out Contact Group negotiation. They are also more sceptical than three weeks ago about the chances of achieving and then maintaining a generalised cessation of hostilities along the existing confrontation line.

4. I explained that the EU had decided at the FAC that they wanted a fast track diplomatic solution. We in the ICFY would do everything we could to facilitate rapid progress. We went over possible maps with Churkin based on a 51-49% split and we will pass on Churkin's comments to the Contact Group. It was always envisaged in the EU Action Plan that the map could be changed as a result of negotiations during the two year period in which the UN would remain in BiH and in particular during the period of any UN administration of Sarajevo. We explained to Churkin that it might be easier for the Americans to discuss the suspension of sanctions once the situation in Gorazde had stabilised. I reminded Churkin that Mitterrand had told Milosevic in Paris in the Spring of last year that he favoured tying the lifting of sanctions to actual Serb troop withdrawals but we also took the opportunity to ram home to Churkin that the more we could advance the modus vivendi in Croatia the easier it would be to suspend sanctions. Churkin is ready to hold another meeting in the Russian Embassy if this would help and has been told by the Serbs in Knin that they would attend such a meeting once more in Zagreb and we know that they are interested in talking about fuel for agricultural purposes. We will be pursuing in Zagreb the potential for such a meeting. Churkin understood that having a territorial link on the map between Bihac and Livno would be a significant way of strengthening border security for the Croatian Republic and make it more likely that there would be eventual autonomy for the Knin Serbs but he thought this would be very hard for the Bosnian Serbs to concede.

Nevertheless if that was the price of having the secure territorial corridor in the north they might think it a price worth paying.

5. Churkin does not envisage being a regular attender at the Contact Group but he does not rule out an occasional attendance and we encouraged him to maintain a link. We left promising to keep in close touch particularly over Brcko. I told Churkin that in my view the current Russian emphasis on Demilitarising safe-areas was unlikely to bear fruit in the Security Council and that it would be wiser for them to focus on getting UN forces on all confrontation lines as quickly as possible.

Notes

Lord Owen, COREU Reports, 19 May and 21 May, Co-Chairman's meetings 17-18 May

SUBJECT: BOSNIA: Activities of Contact Group: Report 4

The Presidency transmits hereafter the following message from Lord Owen.

The Co-Chairmen met on 17 May President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic in Belgrade for almost three hours. They then met Karadzic, Koljevic and Krajisnik in Zvornik for almost four hours. Milosevic assigned the highest priority to the achievement of a general cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. He took the position that political issues, such as territorial delimitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be discussed directly with Bosnian Serb leaders. Karadzic also gave priority to the achievement of a general ceasefire, which would be conducive to the negotiation of political solutions and territorial delimitation. He said that the 11 French nationals in detention would be released in two groups, on Monday and Wednesday next week. Karadzic complained that the BiH Government was launching offensives in different parts of the country and that the Serbs may be forced to take counter offensives. The Co-Chairmen urged restraint and emphasised the importance of full compliance with the agreements concluded with respect to Gorazde. Details follow.

1. When the Contact Group was established I undertook to ensure that member states would be kept fully informed of the activities. I had therefore very much hoped the ICFY members of Contact Group would attend the meeting of the ad hoc group on the former Yugoslavia in Athens on 20 May to give a verbal briefing to supplement the three reports already circulated by COREU. However, this will unfortunately not be possible as all the group are meeting in Washington on the follow-up to the 13 May Ministerial declaration. I am therefore circulating this report on the recent activities of the Contact Group and of myself and Stoltenberg.

2. Following their visits to BiH, reported by COREU, the Contact Group reassembled in Geneva on 12 May to assist in the preparation of the meeting of foreign ministers on 13 May. The Group, including the ICFY legal adviser, Paul Szasz, was involved in the initial drafting of the communiqu for the ministerial meeting and se we as Co-Chairmen were able to feed in our ideas at this stage. The EU was represented by the Troika at the ministerial meeting and involved in the final negotiating of the communiqu. I participated in the general discussion, which was reported by the presidency. As agreed in Geneva, after an initial meeting in Geneva on 14 May to discuss how to carry out its mandate from ministers to prepare for further negotiations with the parties, the full Contact Group, including Paul Szasz, reconvened in Washington on 16 May to work on the substantive preparations for these negotiations, likely to start in France, near Geneva, on 25 May.

3. Stoltenberg and I travelled to Serbia on 17 May to brief Milosevic and Karadzic on the results of the Foreign Ministers meeting and we will meet Tudjman this evening. The US undertook to brief the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats in Geneva on Saturday. Churkin visited Belgrade and saw Milosevic on Monday but did not see the Bosnian Serbs.

4. Meeting with President Milosevic. The Co-Chairmen met President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic from noon until 3.00pm. The meeting was friendly and business-like.

(A) Cessation of hostilities in BiH. The Co-Chairmen and Milosevic agreed that the priority objective was to achieve a general cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic thought that if the war were stopped for four months the people would not want a return to it. He noted that on 22 April the text of a cessation of hostilities agreement had been worked out between Akashi and Karadzic. He thought that the text should be put to all three sides for signature. It could be done individually, there was no need for a signing ceremony. He urged that efforts for a cessation of hostilities be intensified.

(B) Gorazde The Co-Chairmen informed President Milosevic that UNPROFOR had reported that there were Bosnian Serb Military personnel still in the 3 Kilometre exclusion zone in Gorazde and the BiH Governments had taken the position that it would not consider a general cessation of hostilities until the Bosnian Serbs were in Full compliance with the agreement on Gorazde. Milosevic expressed surprise that there were still Bosnian Serb military personnel in the 3 Kilometre exclusion zone. He acknowledged the importance of full compliance with the agreements reached and considered it unhelpful that anything should be done in Gorazde that would have the effect of hindering the achievement of a general cessation of hostilities. He had his staff contact the staff of General Mladic to ascertain the situation. They came back with the reply that British forces were deployed on the Left Bank and Ukranian forces on the Right Bank. He therefore thought that there could be no problem. The Co-Chairmen pointed out to him, however, that the problem was not the deployment of UNPROFOR forces but the presence of Bosnian Serb military elements in the exclusion zone. He then arranged that this point was followed-up again by his staff to help ensure full compliance.

(C) Territorial Delimitation The Co-Chairmen discussed with Milosevic the follow-up to be given to the communiqu issued by foreign ministers of the Contact Group in Geneva last Friday, particularly regarding the implementation of the 51-49% formula. The Co-Chairmen strongly advised that the Bosnian Serbs be encouraged to cooperate in the  implementation of the formula which, they pointed out, was based on agreements previously reached in ICFY negotiations. The Co-Chairmen discussed with Milosevic in detail elements which could be used to arrive at the required 51% for the Bosniac-Croat Federation. Milosevic listened carefully but formally took the position that territorial and political questions should be discussed direct with the Bosnian Serb leadership. The Co-Chairmen kept to this line in public. Milosevic stated repeatedly he would do everything possible to help attain a comprehensive cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, he would in public appear to leave territorial and political issues to be faced directly by the Bosnian Serb leadership which, he thought, should be made to face their responsibilities. It was clear to the Co-Chairmen that since Milosevic's row with Karadzic over Gorazde he has less influence and is also seeking actively to distance himself from some aspects of Bosnian Serb Policy.

(D) Sanctions Milosevic came back at the end of the meeting to what he said was the injustice of the continuation of sanctions. All Serbs, he pointed out, had accepted the European Union Action Plan. The Bosnian Serbs had delivered a map of first 30% for the Muslims and then 33.3%. Serbia and Montenegro had cooperated throughout the search for negotiated solutions. The war was now continuing because the Bosniacs wanted it to continue. The maintenance of sanctions against the FRY was therefore unconscionable. The Co-Chairmen referred to the relevant provisions of the ministerial communiqu but they have no doubt that a phased time-table on sanctions is a high priority for agreement within the contact group and for presentation soon to Milosevic.

(E) Brcko The Co-Chairmen pointed out to Milosevic the potentially explosive situation in Brcko and urged him to call on the Bosnian Serbs to exercise maximum restraint. Milosevic well recognised the dangers over Brcko and said that the Serbs had no interest in a confrontation in the area. However they were being provoked by BiH Government forces and had not reacted. If a Government offensive were launched against Brcko, the Bosnian Serbs would defend it at all cost. This was not like Sarajevo where they had agreed to UN administration and demilitarisation before the threat of air strikes. Nor was it the same as Gorazde.

(F) Contact Group The Co-Chairmen discussed with Milosevic the work of the Contact Group and emphasised the importance of Bosnian Serb cooperation. The Co-Chairmen stressed that the Contact Group offered a real chance for progress, failing which the prospects would be bleak. It was not a question of the level of the diplomats but that governments were now fully engaged. Milosevic recognised that everything possible should be done to avoid a protracted conflict. He therefore repeatedly came back to the importance of achieving a general cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(G) Croatian Talks The Co-Chairmen raised with Milosevic the current state of negotiations between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Serbs and urged him to use his influence to help unblock the current difficulty over the next meeting place. Milosevic thought that the two sides could be expected to agree on Plitvice. He considered it important to proceed with the normalisation of economic relations, the reinstitution of communication and transportation links and the promotion of confidence through practical cooperation. However he pointed out that with regard to normalisation of economic relations the Croatian Serbs were, under the terms of Security Council Resolution 820, affected by sanction s whereas the Croatian Government was not. The Serbs were therefore at a disadvantage, which was a disincentive to the normalisation of economic relations.

(H) Relations with Croatia When asked whether he would consider a meeting with President Tudjman in order to help move along the improvement of relations between their two countries President Milosevic felt that one should, at this stage, give priority to practical measures of cooperation with the local Serbs. President Tudjman, he noted, had been passing through a period of internal political problems in his own party, which President Milosevic thought he would overcome. The idea of a meeting could be kept for a later stage. He was a pains not to criticise Tudjman even over the Federation on which his attitude is that it is not his business and something which he does not expect to last.

(I) Kosovo The Co-Chairmen raised with Milosevic the situation in Kosovo and offered their good offices if he felt that it could assist. They urged him, as they have done many times before, to act for the normalisation of the situation and for the restoration of the linguistic, cultural and educational rights of the Losovar Albanians. Milosevic said that the Kosovar Albanians were citizens of the Republic of Serbia, which would do its duty towards them. He would not, however, do anything that would internationalise the issue. The issue was an internal one and he asked that he should be given time to deal with it. The Co-Chairmen later met former President Cosic who is not seeing Milosevic but who expects in 15 days a book on Kosovo to be published in which he is clearly involved. The book makes radical proposals which he said would stimulate debates in Serbia. This shows that Serbs were changing their attitudes. Even he said Milosevic moving. Djilas also urged us to wait for a wider debated in Serbia before the international community froze its own position.

(J) CSCE On relations with CSCE, Jovanovic said that they had nothing against the organisation and had recently had good conversations with its Secretary-General, Mr. Hoynck. However, it was a matter of principle that the FRY be treated equally. The suspension of its membership could not be accepted. He had suggested that in order to set a course of cooperation, the CSCE need not address the membership issue directly at this stage. It could start the process by inviting FRY experts to CSCE expert meetings. The Co-Chairmen commented that seemed a constructive approach.

5. Meeting with Karadzic Following their meeting with Milosevic the Co-Chairmen travelled by car to Zvornik where they met Karadzic, Koljevic and Krajisnik from 5.00pm until about 8.45pm. While the meeting was friendly, Karadzic and his colleagues were en guard. They had just suffered the loss of 104 Serbian soldiers in a Muslim offensive at Manjevica which had not been publicised. The bodies had been mutilated and this was straining the atmosphere. Karadzic was travelling to the area later and meeting Mladic there.

(A) Cessation of hostilities The Co-Chairmen and Karadzic shared the view that it was important to achieve a general cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina as soon as possible. Karadzic complained that the Bosniacs were on the offensive in many places (he gave the number of 25 separate offensives) and he feared that the Serbs would be obliged to take counter-offensiveness within a matter of days. He said that the Serbs were being treated unequally inasmuch as Bosnian offensives were not noticed whereas the moment Serbs reacted they were pounced upon. His assessment was that the Bosniacs had opted for war. In that case, he said, the Serbs would have no option but to fight. The conflict could drag on for a long time because of the Bosniac choice of war over peace. That was why he shared the assessment that the most important thing was to achieve soon a general cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would provide a better atmosphere for political negotiations.

(B) Gorazde the Co-Chairmen forcefully raised with Karadzic UNPROFOR's finding that Bosnian Serb elements remained in the 3 Kilometre exclusion zone. He said that there were no soldiers remaining. What was occurring was that people whom the Muslims had earlier expelled from Gorazde had stayed in neighbouring Serb villages and had then fought with the Bosnian Serb army in Gorazde. Now that they had returned they did no wish to leave again. They were demobilised elements, who wore military uniforms because of lack of clothing. They were armed for self-protection like Israelis even when off duty. There was a lack of clothing to replace the military attire. He thought UNHCR could assist with replacement clothing. Furthermore, he said, UNPROFOR would need to find a way of protecting these people. It was agreed that on Wednesday 18 May Koljevic and Krajisnik would meet local leaders from Gorazde and he hoped that progress would be made on these issues. The Co-Chairmen told Karadzic it was counter-productive and unfortunate that lingering issues in Gorazde had the effect of blocking progress towards a general cessation of hostilities. They urged him to act urgently to ensure full compliance with the agreements on Gorazde and remove all armed soldiers from the 3 kilometre zone immediately, something which should be easier now that apparently there were no Bosnian military in the zone.

(C) French Detainees Lord Owen raised with Karadzic the situation of the 11 French detainees. He said that they had been involved in taking in supplies for the Muslims and that it was not the first time the organisation in question had done this. The 11 persons were therefore due to be brought before the military courts. He acknowledged his promise to Lord Owen and said he stood by his commitment to obtain their speedy release as a goodwill gesture. However he said that as President he could only enter the picture once the courts had gone through their proceedings. In order to help accelerate matters he had had the cases moved from military to civilian court. He expected the court to finish its work this week and 8 of the detainees would be released on Monday, with the other three released on Wednesday. This separation had come about from within the group itself, some of whose members were angry with others for bringing in prohibited supplies for the Muslims.

(D) Contact Group Karadzic first took the position that the Serbs would only take part in talks on a cessation of hostilities. They would not join talks on political and territorial issues unless sanctions were lifted. They did no want to start another process and go through the same experience of fruitless negotiations while the Muslims opted for the war option.

The Co-Chairmen strongly urged the importance of cooperation with the Contact Group and of Bosnian Serb representation at an appropriate level at the talks planned for next week. The Co-Chairmen pointed out the dangers of a protracted conflict if the opportunity offered by the Contact Group were not seized. They urged that Karadzic and Koljevic should attend. They argued that Buha was not sufficiently authoritative as a negotiator. They pointed out it was not the level of diplomats that mattered in the Contact Group but that from now on they were negotiating in effect with capitals and foreign ministers.

(E) Territorial Delimitation The Co-Chairmen urged Karadzic to cooperate in efforts to provide the Bosniac-Croat federation with 51% of territory as called for in the ministerial communiqu of last Friday. Karadzic replied that the 51-49% formula had never been accepted by the Bosnian Serbs. The 33.3% and the 17.5% were in a specific context, and in return for an immediate agreement for peace. After the Muslims had not accepted the European Union Action Plan the 51/40% formula was no longer on the table. The Serbs would not agree to 51% The 17.5% for the Croats had been premised on an exchange involving Western Slavonia, and for allocation of territory to the Serbs in the Molunatt/Prevlaka area. The Serbs, he insisted, would never give up Brcko or the Posavena corridor. He would not contemplate a territorial corridor for the Bosnia-Croat Federation from Bihac to Livno. Predictably he said the Serbs would not give up Doboj, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Zvornik, Foca or Visegrad. On Doboj the Co-Chairmen argued for flexibility but none was forthcoming. The Serbs knew that the Muslims were only interested in Eastern Bosnia because they wished to trade it off against parts of Sarajevo. The Serbs were adamant over the creation of two cities in Sarajevo district but would be willing to trade Ilijas and Vogosca, they said, for the Eastern enclaves but this could be an area of flexibility. Karadzic repeatedly stated that one should not start from fixed percentages but should give the parties an opportunity to negotiate viable solutions for all sides in the conducive atmosphere of a cessation of hostilities. The Co-Chairmen made it quite clear that the international community would insist on the 51-49% formula and strongly urged him to place on the table a proposal seeing to implement it.

Krajisnik was very interested that the Contact Group were ready to consider again the concept of grey areas for an interim period. This could help soften the presentation, he felt, of a 51-49% split and he was ready to consider defining disputed and non-disputed areas. It was clear that it would be very difficult for the Bosnian Serbs to find the extra one percent or so that is needed. Sanski Most as a disputed area might be teased out of them but not Bosanski Novi and any line should not go too close to Prijedor. On eastern Bosnia there was not the slightest sign of movement. Zvornik is unacceptable and the geographical reasons for this were once again very obvious on our visit. On splitting Visegrad along the Drina the problems remain the hydroelectric plant on the Left Bank and the power lines to Pale. On Foca there was a refusal to move but no real arguments used.

6. In discussions with Cosic and also Djilas on 18 May there was interesting historical stress given their different backgrounds on the differences between the Bosnian Serbs and the Belgrade Serbs. Karadzic according to Djilas was a Mihailovic Serb very different from Milosevic. Cosic while identifying strongly with the Serbian peasants and the nature of the village to village Bosnian war is extremely critical of the brutality of the Bosnian Serbs. He admitted that he had some influence of them and that he was in touch with both politicians and Mladic. He felt the present initiative must succeed if a Palestinian-like conflict was to be avoided and he promised to use whatever influence he had. Both Cosic and Djilas felt that the Bosnian Serbs would, after a settlement, link with Serbia and the Federation split. Both felt the Bosnian Muslims would have to have a small state of their own.

7. The Co-Chairmen are due to meet President Tudjman in the evening of 18 May. They plan to meet in London on Tuesday 24 May with the ICFY element in the Contact Group to discuss the outcome of the Washington meeting and to compare notes before the Contact Group meet hopefully with the parties on 25 May.

Subject: Croatia's Perspective

The Co-Chairmen met on 18 May with President Tudjman in Zagreb. Granic and Susak were present. Concern that BiH map will not focus on Croat concerns. Also briefed Akashi.

1. Discussion at first focused on deadlock over talks between Croatian Government and Croatian Serbs. Tudjman complained that Milosevic was not exercising any positive influence on Martic situation worsening and clear signs that cooperation between Bosnian Serbs and Croatian Serbs increasing. Tudjman already authorised in UNSCR's, yet knows this will be very difficult to achieve.

2. On Bosnia, Tudjman still convinced Muslims want to continue the war. Also he roared with laughter at the Federation map claiming 58% and asked if we could show him some real maps. While we warned Tudjman that neither Milosevic or Karadzic had agreed to a Livno-Bihac territorial link he is still very interested. He asked how the Federation could be taken seriously without such a link and did not accept that a confederation between his Republic and the Federation would be any substitute. They claimed that the Americans are also keen on a link. They rightly see this issue in Geo strategic terms and as probably the only way to control their own border. I made it clear to Tudjman that there would be no chance of persuading the Serbs of the case for a Livno-Bihac link without the Croats offering access to the sea from Molunat to Prevlaka and helping the Serbs achieve a broad territorial link from Banja Luka to Belgrade. I again raised giving Brcko back to the Muslims and providing land for a corridor above the Sava. Tudjman laughed that off, but I am convinced that he would look very seriously at this if it was the clinching factor in a deal involving the Serbs accepting a Bihaclivno link. We explained that the Serbs show no sign of reverting to the Brcko settlement agreed on HMS Invincible and that the Northern corridor is still the biggest stumbling block.

3. We discussed the importance of Mladic. We encouraged Tudjman to arrange direct talks between Croatian military who have a past friendship with Mladic about these strategic issues. Tudjman wants Milosevic to provide a career for Mladic in Serbia. We also stressed that the Federation should not try to claim Bosanski Novi or cut the road to Prijedor. Tudjman argues that in agreeing to the Federation the Croats have met the key Muslim strategic concerns over access to the sea and that the Muslims must now help the Croats over their strategic concerns. On the Intra Muslim must now help the Croats over their strategic concerns. On the Intra Muslim fighting in Bihac, the Croats assess there is a military stalemate which is likely to last.

4. My conclusion from all the meetings we have had is that the Contact Group should consider working up two options to put to the Serbs as alternative routes to an eventual settlement based on a 51-49% split.

(I) Serbs accept a Livno-Bihac territorial corridor now in exchange for a Posavena territorial corridor with territory above the Sava and around Prevlaka in exchange for territory above Dubrovnik. Muslims to be given Doboj and Brcko back. The disputed areas under UN administration would be in addition to Sarajevo district, Zepa and Srebrenica but also Sanski Most and Posavena which would include Modrica, Dobjo and Brcko.

5. One issue that we have so far avoided is the obvious clash between the US need for any implementation force in which they participate to be NATO lead and the Serb hostility to having BATO in their Republic. We need to consider the implications of NATO taking the lead in the territory of the Federation and the UN in the Serbian Republic and in the disputed areas. In this way we might be able to give the Muslims and Croats some credible guarantees that borders once agreed will be maintained.

6. Akashi ready to resume negotiations over cessation of hostilities. We briefed him of Serb attitudes over Gorazde. Akashi did not turn down a military request for close air support over Tuzla. No such request reached him, military had to weigh many conflicting priorities.

Subject: Bosnia

The Presidency circulates the following message from Lord Owen.

Following Co-Chairmen's meeting in Belgrade on 17th Milosevic rang Akashi in Zagreb on 19th and said he had taken action following our explanation over what was happening in Gorazde. Milosevic was confident all Serb military would be out of the 3 Km zone by Saturday 21st. Akashi has now written to the parties to say he wants to start talks on the cessation of hostilities no later than Monday 23rd. Akashi feels on past experience this may take until Friday 27th before hopes for successful conclusion. This may affect timing of Contact Group meeting with parties. Co-Chairmen negotiating with Croatian Serbs and hoping to arrange early meeting between them and the Croatian Government.